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T.: Passage of Time as Laches

PASSAGE OF TIME AS LACHES

Will mere passage of time ever constitute laches? The answer
to this question depends largely on which scholars or on which
cases one chooses to rely. No attempt is made in this discussion to
include the many cases where the equity court has applied the
statute of limitations by analogy, an entirely different problem
from the one at hand.
In 1892, a suit of foreign attachment was brought on a note
payable on demand, where more than twenty-six years had elapsed
between the maturity of the note and institution of the suit. The
West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals held that "a court of
equity will readily presume that the testator had waived and
abandoned all thought of collecting this note."' In 1955, in a suit
to enforce a lien, where two time notes were secured by a deed of
trust, and enforcement had been delayed forty and twenty-nine
years after due date, the court held that delay alone did not con2
stitute laches, and allowed enforcement of the notes.
Has there been a change in the rule as to whether passage of
time alone will constitute laches, or is this simply another instance
of the wide discretion of the equity court in deciding cases which
are similar but not identical, without regard to past decisions?
Will mere passage of time constitute laches? An examination
of the treatises of three leading scholars discloses the followig
disagreement:
(1) "Equity does not impute laches to a party for delay
alone, but only for a delay which is unreasonable under the
circumstances and which has resulted in harm to the other
party. Where no prejudice has 3resulted, a long delay has been
eld not to amount to laches."
(2) "There can be no doubt, however, that laches may
be established as a defense, and equity will refuse relief on
that ground, though no important change of position has taken
place, if the delay on the plaintiff's part has been very extended."4
(3) "There are no hard and fast rules as to what amounts
to laches; it is a question to be determined upon all the facts
by the court in the exercise of its judicial discretion." 5
iMaslin's Ex'rs v. Iiett, 37 W. Va. 15,23, 16 S.E. 437,489 (1892).

2 Kuhn &Hoover v. Shreeve, 141 W. Va. 170, 89 S.E.2d 685 (1955).
3
4
5

McCLn-roc, Equrry § 28, at 71 (2d e. 1948).
'WAUH, Equi
§ 102, at 473 (1980).
CLur,

EQurry, § 31, at 47 (1954).
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STUDENT NOTES
A cursory glance at the horde of West Virginia cases concerning laches would indicate that the rule in this state is quite absolute.
The court has often stated that mere delay will not constitute
laches. 6 The court has also held that mere lapse of time, unaccompanied by circumstances which create a presumption that the
7
right has been abandoned, does not constitute laches. In holding
fifteen years delay in enforcing a lien against a tract of coal not to
constitute laches, delay which places another at a disadvantage was
required.8 Sixteen years' delay in bringing suit to account for
money received from sale of land, without prejudice to the defendant, does not constitute laches. 9 The court stated in an early
case that laches did not exist in a suit to set aside a fraudulent conveyance since the parties to the transaction still survived.10 Lapse
of time has been said to be an element, but not the controlling
factor of laches." It has also been held that mere delay, if ex2
plained, is not laches.1
After being struck by this salvo of cases, even many cautious
observers may be ready to concede that the rule is well settled in
this state that passage of time alone does not constitute laches.
However, hidden among these many cases are several others which
tend to modify, if not to entirely impeach the credibility of the
general rule.
Often, our court has defined laches as a delay in the assertion
of a known right which works to the disadvantage of another, or
such delay as will warrantthe presumptionthat the party has waived
his right. 3 Since this principle is stated in the disjunctive, it seems
proper to assume that delay alone is sufficient if the delay creates a
presumption that the right has been waived. But what constitutes
waiver of a right? In Maslinfs Exrs v. Hiett,14 twenty-six years' delay after maturity, without enforcing a note was held to be a
waiver. But waiver was not mentioned in the comparatively recent
case of Kuhn & Hoover v. Shreeve.15 However, waiver has not
6 E.g., Acker v. Martin, 136 W. Va. 503, 68 S.E.2d 721 (1951); Bank v.
McLaughlin, 123 W. Va. 608, 17 S.E.2d 218 (1941); Curl v. Vance, 116
W. Va. 419, 181 S.E. 412 (1985).
7 Stuart v. Realty Corp., 141 W. Va. 627, 92 S.E.2d 891 (1956).
8 Camden v. Coal & Coke Co., 106 W. Va. 812, 145 S.E. 575 (1928).

9 Carter v. Carter, 107 W. Va. 894, 148 S.E. 878 (1929).
10 Pethtel v. McCullough, 49 W. Va. 520, 89 S.E. 199 (1901).
11 Bank v. McLaughlin, 121 W. Va. 41, 1 S.E.2d 251 (1989).
12 Hoglund v. Curtis, 184 W. Va. 785, 61 S.E.2d 642 (1950).

lE.g., Bank v. Coal Corp., 188 W. Va. 689, 57 S.E.2d 786 (1949); Bank

121 W. Va. 41, 1 S.E.2d 251 (1939).
v. McLaughlin,
14
Note 1 supra.
15 Note 2 supra.
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been forgotten, for in 1955, the same year as the Kuhn & Hoove
case, in a suit to enjoin maintenance of a gate across a road, our
court held that twenty-six years without bringing such suit constituted ]aches. The court stated that "delay in the assertion of a
right may operate in equity as evidence of assent, acquiescence or
waiver unless satisfactorily explained." 16 An earlier case by dicta
noted that the rule later stated in Monk v. Gillenwater'7 is well
settled in this jurisdiction.' 8 Laches defined as a claim which has
been for a long time undemanded was endorsed by the court in
1927.19 In an early case, in a suit for reformation of a deed, the
court held ten years' delay after conveyance to constitute laches,
stating "a court of equity will not assist one who has slept upon
20
his rights and shows no excuse for his laches in asserting them."
In denying an annulment, where the husband claimed that his
wife refused sexual intercourse, the court held that six and one-half
years was too long a time of deliberation, mentioning neither
21
waiver or laches.
It seems plausible to presume that the court will continue to
state and apply in many cases the rule that mere lapse of time does
not constitute laches. If passage of time alone is to be used as the
basis for laches, it is likely it will continue to be disguised as
acquiescence, waiver, or abandonment of right. There seems to be
no indication what path the court will follow in any given case, as
long as the court continues to exercise its wider-than-usual discretion.
J. S. T.

16 Monk v. Gillenwater, 141 W. Va. 27, 33, 87 S.E.2d 532, 541 (1955).
17 Ibid.
18 Maze v. Bennett, 114 W. Va. 169, 171 S.E. 249 (1933).

In this case a

change of conditions, i.e., death of the original parties to a conveyance and

failure of both parties to execute conveyances in the agreement, aided the
court in finding laches in an action to remove cloud on title.
19 McMullin v. Matheney, 104 W. Va. 317, 140 S.E. 10 (1927). Here,
death of certain parties and loss of evidence aided the court in finding laches,
but the court stressed the want of reasonable diligence and lack of activity
on the2 plaintifFs part.
o Phillips v. Piney Coal Co., 53 W. Va. 543, 548, 44 S.E. 774, 776 (1903).
21 Allen v. Allen, 126 W. Va. 415, 28 S.E.2d 829 (1944).
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